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The first of the two previous chapters con-
centrated on empirical evidence of the need
to keep stocks aligned with sales, and the sec-
ond on evidence of the need to time pur-
chasing with an eye to conditions in the ma-
terials markets. This segmented approach,
which in even more exaggerated form has
characterized all of the empirical work in this
book, must now be abandoned.
I want instead to attempt to read the data
in the context of all of the factors that po-
tentially influence stocks and their interrela-
tionships. Also I want to project the implica-
tions of the procedures, which result in posi-
tive and negative inventory investment, in
terms of their impact on the relation between
selling and materials buying (a question that
has occupied parts of Chapters 7 and 8). Inte-
grated with the analysis of stocks and total
ownership, this will afford a comparison be-
tween the findings of this study and other
analyses of the amplifying and accelerating
attributes of inventory investment. I find that
when theseveral aspects ofa model are
specified for department stores, on the one
hand, and durable goods manufacturers on
the other hand, the amplifying and accelerat-
ing processes that result are rather different
for the two sorts of enterprise.
TWO CONCEPTUAL PROBLEMS
The two objectives of this chapter each raise
a conceptual problem that requires a mo-
ment's analysis. First, to examine the inter-
relationship of all of the factors that influence
stocks, it is necessary to define and somehow
cope with the failure to meet objectives and
its manifestation—unintended stocks. Second,
to analyze the relation between selling and
buying, it is necessary to define selling: does
it take place when sales orders are written
or when the goods are shipped to customers?
Error and Inventory Objectives
The interrelations between the two influ-
ences on inventory fluctuation which the fig-
ures have highlighted, the sales link and mar-
ket conditions, must be affected by any other
influence that bears on the ownership of ma-
terials. Many of these have remained invisible
in the data. They include a wide variety of
opportunity costs, such asthat of flexible
production schedules, selling effort, and the
executive time and other costs of formulating
and enforcing precise inventory objectives.
But they also include downright error in
the sense of more or less clearly formulated
inventory objectives which are not met. The
recognized error and resulting unintended in-
ventory investment must be corrected in some
way. Desired stocks are necessarily defined in
terms of future demands, market expectations,
and other factors;this implies predictions,
and predictions are seldom accurate. Even
when correction is firmly intended, it may
take time to achieve; unintended or error11. FLUCTUATION IN OWNERSHIP AND INVENTORY MODELS 211
stocks exist until the correction is effected.
The size of potential error depends on sev-
eral matters—how well the target information
can be predicted; the quality of the informa-
tion system; the length of time between the
target date and the time, in advance of that
date, when action directed toward an achieve-
ment of intentions must be taken; the level
of discipline in the organization; the possi-
bility of piecemeal progressive correction.
If study focuses on stock on hand, error
can be exceedingly troublesome. Its detection
implies a virtually complete knowledge of in-
tended inventory change, of the character of
forecast, and of the machinery whereby ob-
jectives are acted upon. Yet without this in-
formation it is very difficult indeed to use em-
pirical data to suggest what businessmen are
trying to do and why; since they do not suc-
ceed in doing it, the data do not reveal it.
The distributed-lag notion that has been used
in econometric analysis tries to circumvent the
difficulty. But, as suggested in Chapter 1, when
calculations indicate that an inventory objec-
tive, as defined, is only half achieved in the
course of the year, the dodge does not seem
very effective.
Eventually it should be possible to learn
enough to fill in more of the information that
isessential to describing the path whereby
action moves toward specifying and achieving
inventory intention in various sorts of busi-
ness enterprises. But in the meantime there
is,I think, a different way around the diffi-
culty. It is, of course, as indicated at the out-
set of this study, to include stocks on order
as well as on hand.
If ownership turns out to be different than
presently desired, the difference can be re-
versed. Desired ownership is partly defined by
a set of desired relationships to a number of
variables—sales, costs, and so on. Prediction
of the ownership that will be optimal in the
future implies a prediction of how the relevant
variables will behave. Errors in these guesses
are one source of discrepancy between actual
and desired ownership. Difference may also
result from a change in the relationship that
is desired. But whatever the reason, new orders
can correct promptly if the error is recognized
and if it is deemed worthwhile to reverse it.
Changes in the price of finished goods, sales
pressure, and a number of other strategies may
be brought into play. But certainly a most
usual and important strategy is to modify the
volume of new orders.
For errors of underestimation the correction
can be virtually immediate; all that is required
is an increase in new orders for materials.
For errors of overestimation, correction may
take a bit more time, since particular items
may be overstocked by more than feasible
reduction in new orders can immediately re-
verse. Even cancellation of orders may be un-
able to achieve the objective.
Of course the correction that orders effect
may be less than optimal. Its first impact is
on stock on order whereas one might prefer
to change the amount of stocks actually on
hand or, for that matter, in the process of
production or finished. But as a rough ap-
proximation the level of. total materials own-
ership may be regarded as hovering not too
far from the desired level, if not month by
month at least quarter by quarter.
Accordingly I make the assumption that un-
intended or "error stocks," in the restricted
sense in which I have defined them, are suf-
ficiently unimportant to neglect in statistics
on materials ownership. The assumption re-
lieves me of the embarrassing necessity of con-
structing a model which I do not know how
to construct—one dealing with a detailed set
of objectives, a time path of expectations and
a time path of actions overlaid on one an-
other as relevant information is generated.
However, and this is an important qualifica-
tion, error of a more passive sort may be both
present and large. I refer to ownership which
on the one hand is different from what would
presently be deemed ideal, but which on the
other hand is not subject to explicit and high-
priority correction. In other words, if the cal-
culation is made, and it may not be made212 SEARCH FOR EXPLANATIONS
except as a visceral judgment, the opportunity
costs of the sequence of procedures that would
recognize and keep the error in check are too
high. This passive unintended stock both on
hand and on order is a no-man's land be-
tween stocks that conform to some formulated
intention and stocks whose failure so to con-
form is, under the circumstances, worth the
opportunity costs of identification and swift
correction.
Orders and Shipments
The orientation of this study toward in-
cluding materials stocks on order as well as
those on hand was based on the belief that
a basic aspect of management conceptualiza-
tion and behavior was thereby duplicated.
Procurement is oriented in terms of buying,
which implicitly if not explicitly affects stock
on hand as well as on order. Thus far I have
largely ignored the question of whether there
is a counterpart at the selling end of the
business. The counterpart would assert that
the basic conception of "demand" to which
the sales-linked stock objective (or indeed any
other stock objective) responded consisted of
customers' orders rather than of shipments to
customers (or production). Certainly this is
a possibility that must be considered. My gen-
eral conclusion is that it is more realistic to
keep consideration of the stock-flow align-
ments focused on shipments, and to deal with
the further impact of new sales orders in terms
of the way in which they diverge from ship-
ments; specifically, to deal with them in terms
of the rate of change in unfilled orders, com-
monly called back orders or order backlogs.
This question has no operational implica-
tions in connection with the department store
data, since customers' orders and sales are
virtually identical. But in connection with the
data for durable goods manufacturing, the dif-
ference can be quite significant and therefore
it will be useful to take the detour necessary
to spell out the whys and wherefores.
The basic reason is simply that there are
costs associated with holding goods. Ideally,
therefore, materials should be acquired just
soon enough for them to arrive, with an ac-
ceptable likelihood and at an acceptable ac-
quisition cost at the shipment (or processing)
station at just the time when the work is
scheduled to be performed. The time at which
customers order an article is related to these
scheduled times, but the relationship differs
under at least four circumstances that need to
be distinguished.
Variant 1. When the time between the writ-
ing of an order and the time when production
of them must begin is long. The disparity can
be due to delay in starting production because
of backlogs already on the books. Or many
months may be required actually to produce
articles, and a scheduled flow of materials
may be required throughout the processing
period. Under either circumstance theeffi-
cient servicing of sales, other things the same,
does not require that materials orders parallel
sales orders; it requires rather that materials
are ordered just on time to arrive with ac-
ceptable probability and at acceptable order-
ing costs at each production station as needed
for production to get under way. However, as
we have rehearsed all too often, many factors
other than sales can influence procurement
policy and argue in favor of buying before
the efficient dates.
A firm order for the final product largely
removes one set of risks which would other-
wise attend advance acquisition—the risk of
obsolescence, that is, of having purchased ma-
terials that will not be needed. Thus a back-
log of sales orders provides a period of option
during which materials can be bought ahead
if it is judged desirable to do so at what is in
effect a lower cost than if the backlog were
not present.
Variant 2. When the purchasing may in
large part be linked to a particular order as
for variant1, but the interval between the
writing of an order and the start of produc-11. FLUCTUATION IN OWNERSHIP AND INVENTORY MODELS 213
tion is short. In this case, materials purchasing
and sales orders may have a systematic rela-
tionship, with orders leading by short inter-
vals. The order in effect foretells shipment
of the finished goods by the length of the pro-
duction period, and helps thereby to effectuate
sales-linkedinventoryobjectives.Materials
which are ordered at the time the sales order
is written may arrive in time to be used in its
fabrication, and if not they will at least re-
place the units of stock which were actually
used.
Variant 3. When sales are customarily made
from stock. This means that there is no neces-
sary tie between a particular sale and a par-
ticular purchase of materials. Procurement is
geared to the necessities of efficient produc-
tion, efficient stock management, and expected
shipments. In this case, then, sales orders and
shipmentsofthecompany's productare
virtually identical.
Variant 4. When only some sales are made
from stock and some or all of such sales con-
sist of goods that the purchaser orders to fill
in depleted stocks. This portion of total sales
may have a tendency to reach highs and lows
ahead of the bulk of all other sales
ordersmay fore-
cast changes in totalsales orders or ship-
ments in the near future and thus serve to
guide procurement toward realizing itsin-
ventory objective. But here the distinction
is not between orders and shipments;itis
between some portion of orders which are
virtually identical to the same portion of ship-
ments and different from the rest of orders,
which in turn may be identical to shipments
(variant 3) or different in one of the two ways
described as variant 1 or 2.
In variants 1 and 2 there can be differences
1Thereason for the lead is not material to the
argument. It is implicit, I believe, in the tendency for
forecasts to be based on current sales and for these
forecasts to be thebasis for advance orders. The
advance orders will then be in error by the amount
that sales have changed. These rates of change in
sales tend to lead sales proper. (See K. P. Mack, Con-
sum ption and Business Fluctuation, pp. 105 and 243.)
between the time pattern of sales orders and
shipments. For ohe thing, it is the pattern of
shipments or, more particularly, production
starts and other production stages that sets
the requirements for materials that are needed
to achieve physical efficiency in processing and
shipments, other things the same. Second, var-
iants 1 and 2 provide a good forecasting tech-
nique which makes it possible to enforce what-
ever shipments or production-linked inven-
tory objectives may be held. In connection par-
ticularly with variant1, though sometimes
also with variant 2, advance knowledge of re-
quirements reduces the risk and therefore the
cost of altering the timing of buying with a
view to future prices or market conditions—
at least the wrong items will not be bought.
Indeed it may be risky not to buy ahead in
order to materials prices" to correspond
with the cost of materials as figured in the
selling price.
In variants 3 and 4, orders and shipments
are identical, but in the case of variant 4 one
part of either shipments or orders can serve
the function of aiding to forecast shipments
and thereby to enforce a stock objective.
These observations imply the way in which
demand should be conceptualized as it moves
backward through a firm from its customers
to its suppliers. The demand from the cus-
tomer is best viewed in the first instance as
shipments (or, where the data are available,
as demand for materials at various critical sta-
tions such as the start of or other points in
the process of production). Demand so defined
gives rise to inventory objectives for goods
both on hand and on order, and is therefore
both directly and indirectly a basic determi-
nant of the orders placed with suppliers. How-
ever, the pattern of sales orders can have an
important further bearing on materials orders.
For one thing, it can, via its role as a fore-
cast of shipments, make it possible to enforce
inventory objectives. Second, insofar as ship-
ments and new sales orders differ, this dif-
ference is identified by the rate of change in214 SEARCH FOR EXPLANATIONS
back orders. The level of these back orders,
and perhaps their rate of change, influences
some of the cost of alternative materials pur-
chasing and inventory schemes, and is there-
fore important to purchasing and inventory
policy.
DEPARTMENT STORES
For department stores the data fall neatly into
the ideal conceptual framework. Customers'
orders are identical for all intents and pur-
poses to department store sales and therefore
unfilled sales orders are negligible. All in-
ventory on hand and on order is presumably
covered by the two sets of statistics. Orders
placed for materials cover orders for all of
the merchandise sold.
Dynamics of the Sales-Stock Link
The link of ownership to sales has appeared
to be firm and relatively precise according to
the picture presented in Chapter 9 and else-
where. It is evidenced both by a marked paral-
lelism between sales and ownership proper
and also, a more sensitive test, between rates of
change in the two series. The latter associa-
tiQn is shown in curves 2 and S of Chart 15.
Table 40, line 4, gives the individual timing
comparisons. Seven of the twelve matched
turns are virtually synchronous—within one
month of one another—and only two differ by
more than three months. Eighty-four per cent
of the months are in like phase on a syn-
chronous basis. To explain the association,
the merchant may be pictured as judging
whether and about how fast sales have been
increasing (or decreasing) over the past few
months and whether they are likely to in the
immediate future. He then adjusts his buildup
in stocks on hand and on order in an ap-
propriate fashion.2 If sales are expected to be
2 The actual judgment is likely to compare the rate
at which sales are "going ahead" relative to the cor-
responding months of the previous year; an ad hoc
judgment may be made as to how appropriate the base
months are. I have computed this set of ratios (using
seasonally adjusted data, which are not appropriate),
and differenced them, but they appear to be less well
higher by a given amount than at some refer-
ence date, stocks should also be higher by at
least as much plus whatever stock cushion
is needed and likewise if sales are lower. The
adjustment consists of additions to and sub-
tractions from new orders which would other-
wise have been placed. (I am ignoring other
adjustments, such as markdowns, which are
also used.) The pattern of the adjustment
would be that of the rate of change in sales,
and its volume would depend on the charac-
ter of the ownership-sales objective.
In actual practice, provisions are likely to
have a shingled pattern. Advance orders are
placed for some fraction of the expected sea-
son's requirements; expectations are based on
corresponding periods of the previous year
adjusted for special sales, weather, and other
elements affecting last year's figure, and for
trends over the intervening months. The ad-
justment can, in effect, mean that forecasts
are virtually based on deseasonalized sales of
previous months. Fill-in orders, placed as close
to the time when they will be needed as speed
of delivery permits, reflect more recent sales
history. At-once orders, for immediate delivery,
may provide a further form of adjustment.
Both fill-in and at-once orders will reflect
rates of change in sales, assuming that current
or previous sales provide a common denom-
inator of forecasting procedures.3
correlated with change in ownership than the moving
average of recent change. This could mean that the
ad hoc judgments which are made toadjustthe
formal calculations for recognized abnormalities are
of some importance.
3 The basis of these generalizations were discussed
in connection with shoe retailing in my Consumption
and Business Fluctuations, pp. 95—112. The sales-linked
portion of buying was called "stable-market orders."
For department stores as a whole, buying procedures
were discussed in Ruth P. Mack and Victor Zarnowitz,CHART 15
Note: Vertical dashed and solid lines mark, respectively, peaks and troughs in change in sales.
aFive-monthaverage of five-month average; turns marked in the original five-month average
prior to second smoothing.b Five-month centered moving averages; turns marked in under-
lying monthly data except for change in ownership. cNeworders deflated by retail price
index of commodities other than foods and autos, 1957—59 =
Changes in Sales Compared with Selected Series, Department Stores, 1946—63
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TABLE 40
Timing: Change in Sales, Ownership, and New Orders, Department Stores, 1946—1962
SectionA:Months Lead (—)orLag(+)forMatched Turnsa
Reference
Chronologyb
P T P T P T P T P T P T
Line Series0 194719471948194919511952195319541957195819601961
Specific Series: Change in Sales
1Subcycles ...11r_8r 12 —a —9 —14_9r_14r 30 —4—12 —3
2Ratio stocks
to sales _10r_8r —11 —21 —37 —12—14 —7
3Change in stocks,
inverse +6 +6 +19+11 +6+13 +7 +14 +24+15 +8+13
4Change in
ownership —1 0 +1 +8 —1 3 +2 3 —9 +1 0 +1
5New orders —3 +1 0 +1 —2 0 3 —7 —21 0—11 —1
5a New orders,
trend corrected —3 0 0 +1 —2 0 +1 7 10 0 1 1
6Change in stocks 3 —6 —1 +1 —5 —1 —5 —11 —2—10 —1
7 R: stocks to sales,
inverse —1 +4 0 n —2 —2 +5 +4 +7
8 R: outstanding
orders to stocks —1 —6 —1 +1 —1 —4 0 —5 —11 —2 0 0
SpecificSeries: New Orders
9Suboycles _8F 8r —12 —4 —7 —14 —6 —7 —9 —4 —1 —2
10Change in
ownership +2 0 +1 +7 +1 —3 +5 +4 +12 +1+11 +2
11Receipts —2 —7 —2 —1 —6 —5 0 0 —6 0 0 0
12D.I. vendor
performance —6 —1 +3 —2 —11+6 +1+12 0
13Sales —11 —1 —6 0 —4 0 —10 —2 0 —1
13aChange in sales +3 —1 0 —1 +2 0 +3 +7 +21 0+11 +1
SpecificSeries:Changein Ownership
14Vendor performance —6 —2 —4 —3 —8 +1 —3 0 —1 —5 +7
Specific Series: Ratio Outstanding Orders to Stocks
15Change in stocks —2 0 0 0 —3 1 1 0 0 0 10 1
























Specific Series: Change in Sales
ISubcycles 120 0—11.5—6.0 —10.04.24.34.84.29,10,11 69 67
2Ratio stocks to
sales 80 0 —12.5 —10.0—11.57.24.56.05.9 —1l,—12 52 53
3Change in stocks
inverse 0 12 0+7.5 +13.0 +12.05.32.0 4.53.7 +12,+13 68 71
4Change in
ownership 55 2—0.5+0.5 02.32.7 2.52.5 0 84 83
5Neworders 73 2—3.0 0 —1.55.01.74.03.3 —1,—2 74 74
Sa New orders,
trend corrected 62 4—1.5 0 —0.52.51.52.22.0 —1,0 85 86
6Change stocks 111 0—4.03.5—4.03.5 2.3 2.92.9 —2 to —5 81 81
7 stocks to
sales, inverse 341—0.5+4.5+2.01.52.53.02.0 0,+2,+4 77 77
8R: outstanding
orders to stocks 8 13—1.0—3.0—1.02.0 2.32.32.2 —1 85 86
Specific Series: New Orders
9Subcycles 120 0—7.5—5.5—7.02.53.22.82.8 —7 81 81
10Change in
ownership 1101+3.5+1.5+2.04.0 2.53.23.2 +2 79 79
11Receipts 70 5—2.0—0.5—1.52.0 2.2 2.22.1 —1,—2 86 88
12D. I. vendor
performance 461+3.7+0.5+1.34.6 5.2 5.24.9 +1 69 72
13Sales 70 3—6.7—0.7—1.53.50.73.13.1 —1,—2 82 82
13a Change in sales 73 2—3.0 0 —1.55.01.74.03.3 1,2 74 74
Specific Series: Change in Ownership
14Vendor performance821—1.7—3.5—2.71.93.5 2.82.8 3 83 84
Specific Series:Ratio Outstanding Orders to Stocks
15Change in stocks, 60 6—1.5 0•0.52.30.31.51.3 —1,0 91 91218 SEARCH FOR EXPLANATIONS
Notes to Table 40
aSpecific series are matched with the inch-
cated reference series (see note c) in accord-
ance with the standard NBER rules. A double
relaxation of rules is marked r;it applies to
cases for well-conforming series in which two
like turns are matched, though an unlike turn
lies between them. The figure is underlined
when subcyclechronologyisthe reference
series, a minor cycle in the specific series has
entered a comparison; or, when two individual
series are compared, a minor cycle in either
series has entered a comparison. When the busi-
ness cycle chronology provides the reference,
minor specific cycle turns are ignored.The
meaning of other symbols is:
turn in the reference series does not ap-
pear in the specific series.
turn in the specific series does not appear
in the reference series.
0thereis no turn in either series in the
neighborhoodofthechronologydate.
bChronology datesare years when business
cycle turns occur. They indicate the sequence
and approximate time when the specific turns
occur for which timing comparisons are given.
cReference series are the series whose spe-
cific cycles plus minor cycles constitute the
The fact that there is no systematic lag in
change in ownership suggests that errors can
be corrected within the month, either by at-
once delivery of merchandise or by increas-
ing or decreasing new orders relative to what
they would otherwise have been. The respon-
sibility of outstandings in effectuating inten-
tions is suggested by the behavior of the ratio
of stocks on order to stocks on hand; the ratio
"Cause and Consequence of Changes inRetailers'
Buying," American Economic Review, March 1958,
pp. 19—32. The formula used to represent the two
portions of stable-market orders, advance buying and
corrective orders, followed the general notions dis-
cussed in the text above.
Closelysimilar ideas are described in Richard M.
Cyertand James G. March, A Behavioral Theory of
the Firm, Englewood Cliffs,N.J.,1963. They made
an intensive study of a department in a large retail
department store and a less extensive study of about
a dozen others. They believe that the decision process
they report "could be generalized with trivial changes
reference dates with which matching cycles in
thespecific series are compared.
dThenumber of months during which the
specificseries is in like phase with the refer-
enceseries is expressed as a percentage of the
total number of months covered between dates
as given.
eMedianis the average timing of the center
twoor three turns.
1Averagedeviation from the median. The
"weighted"(wt'd)averageisthe deviation
from the median for peaks and for troughs sep-
arately, weighted by the number of turns.
determining monthsinlikephase a
timing adjustment is made which maximizes
confluence.Before counting the months in
phase, the specific series is in effect moved to
the right to allow for a lead and to the left to
allow for a lag if by so doing the percentage of
months in like phase (as rounded) is increased.
If the months in pha;se are as large or larger
without an adjustment, this is indicated by a
"timing adjustment" of 0.
In some cases we wish to know the per-
centage of months in phase on a synchronous
basis, regardless of whether the percentage in
phase is thereby maximized. If so, the "timing
adjustment" is given as "none."
constitutes the bottom line in Chart 15. By
andlarge,outstandings become relatively
larger when rates of change in sales are in
rising phase—that is, when a decline slows or a
rise accelerates—and ou tstandings become rela-
tively smaller when a rise slows and a decline
accelerates. In line 8 of Table 40 a comparison
of change in sales and the outstandings-stock
ratio reveals 85 per cent of months are in
like phase after allowing for a one month's
toother departmentsinthe same merchandizing
group and could be generalized with relatively modest
changes to most other departments outside the im-
mediate group" (p.129). They distinguish between
advance orders and reorders. Advance orders consist
of some percentage of the sales of the corresponding
period of the previous year; reorders represent the rest
of the last year'stotal plus "minimum amount of
stock desired at all times" minus stock presently at
hand "including stock ordered." Reorders cover the
period that represents the minimum time that sup-
pliers require to make deliveries.11. FLUCTUATION IN OWNERSHIP AND INVENTORY MODELS 219
lead of change insales;twelve turns are
matched, eight of which are within plus or
minus two months of one another.
Though outstandings move sooner and
more agilely than do stocks, it is notable that
at least the rate of change in stocks is subject
to a similarly rapid response. We noted this
in the sharp parallelism between outstand-
ings proper and the rate of change in stocks.
It is visible here in the higher degree of cor-
respondence between the rate of change in
stocks and the outstandings-stock ratio (note
that stocks proper are the denominator of the
ratio): 91 per cent of the months are in like
phase on a synchronous basis (Table 40,
line 15).
These strong empirical associations seem
to reflect what I have termed the shingled
pattern of ordering.If current sales have
been underestimated, retailers do two sorts of
things:(I) They increase orders for at-once
delivery; since these orders represent only a
small part of total stocks (which in the ag-
gregate are influenced by the level of sales),
the influx of at-once orders influences prima-
rily the rate at which stocks change. (2) They
increase orders for longer term; since the base
level of outstandings is relatively small, and
the correction may be applied to requirements
for several future months, the influx is likely
to represent a sufficient portion of the total
to determine its level rather than simply its
rate of change.
If current sales have been overestimated,
again, orders for both immediate and advance
delivery will be affected. At-once orders will
not need to cover shortages, and the usual
complement of things that are better bought
after all the news is in may tend to be smaller.
Mark downs may help to turn stocks. The
advance preseason orders will have covered a
large enough portion of the season's require-
ments so that orders of intermediate term can
be relatively low. Indeed, any excuse to cancel
orders may be grasped. In addition, current
buying for flex t season may be more con-
servative.
These manifestations of effective effort to
keep rates of change in sales and in ownership
moving together seem to reflect the importance
to successful retail store operation of precise
inventory objectives enforced with determina-
tion.
Other Influences
But the association of ownership and sales
that aggregate figures show differs in an im-
portant respect from what a simple physically
efficient association with sales, other things the
same, would imply: The adjustment is too
large. Toward the end of Chapter 9 we tried
to say how much too large changes in owner-
ship may have been. The estimates were based
on alternative assumptions about physically
efficient ownership-sales relationships.
On the average, department store owner-
ship equaled about four months' sales. Yet
the increase and decrease in ownership during
its specific cycle movements average 61/4times
the specific cycle increase and decrease in sales.
Obviously change was more than proportional.
Had it remained proportional at a hand-to-
mouth level, cyclical fluctuation in ownership
would have been 31%timesthat of sales. But
the study of the purposes that stocks serve
suggests that the efficient sales link tends to
imply constant incremental rather than aver-
age relations at least in the short run. An
incrementalassociationof2 would have
meant, of course, that ownership rose and fell
during cyclical phases just twice as much as
did sales (a trifle more when buffer stock is
allowed for).
An alternative way of expressing the prob-
lem the figures pose is to note that a constant
average ratio, at hand-to-mouth levels, would
have explained only about 70 per cent of
actual change in ownership even if we assume
that all specific change in ownership was some-
how caused by the corresponding specific cy-
cles in sales (Table 33, line l0a). If the in-
cremental rather than average association had
been the effective sales link, only 38 per cent220 SEARCH FOR EXPLANATIONS
of all change would have been attributable
to cyclical changes in consumer demand (line
lOc) even at the liberal incremental ratio of
2.
How can the rest of the fluctuation in own-
ership be accounted for? One possibility would
be that it is unintended, though there is little
reason to suppose that ownership (as distin-
guished from stocks on hand) would need
to be seriously out of line for long. That it
is not unintended in the sense that it moves
up when sales move down or vice versa was
indicated by the substantial confluence of the
two series. Indeed, 88 per cent of the total spe-
cific cycle fluctuation in ownership occurred
when sales were in like phase.4 Apparently,
then, the disproportionate volatility of owner-
ship must be explained in terms of events that
tend to parallel the direction of change in con-
sumer demand.
Lack of appropriate data on conditions in
the markets in which the wares carried by
department stores are bought prevents ade-
quate exploration of what some of these events
might be. All that we can do is observe the
not uninteresting parallelism between the
quite inappropriate series, the rate at which
vendors' performance (primarily in durable
goods industries)deteriorates or improves,
and the efforts of merchants to build up or
draw down supplies, as reflected by the num-
ber of months' supply held on order or the
rate of change of stocks on hand.
Interplay Between Demand and
Market Considerations
Taken together, these conclusions require
that the exaggerated association of change in
ownership and in sales may be explained in
4 figure is an average of phase-by-phase ratios.
The numerator for, say, an expansion phase is the
rise in ownership between trough and peak dates for
the specific cycle expansion in sales; the denominator
is the rise in ownership during the matched specific
cycle phase in ownership. Measures for a noncon-
forming cycle after the Korean peak were omitted.
terms that account for a tight link to consumer
buying and its rate of change, and yet allow for
amplification on the one hand and other in-
fluences on the other hand.
Start with the individual store that has
been "going ahead" by encouraging amounts
(doing better than the corresponding period
of the previous year). Buying must increase
sufficiently to replace the merchandise sold
and to take care of the normal needs for ef-
ficient servicing of sales. Good and improving
profits provide funds for carrying the increase
in stocks that this implies. Profits also provide
funds for supporting further commitments at
what may be felt to be low opportunity costs
if there are reasons to buy more heavily. Will
such reasons exist?
One reason may simply be the management
rule of thumb which stipulates that the con-
stant sales-stock ratio should be maintained.
Ifthis ruleisin general currency in the
store, the chances are that increasing sales
make stocks look light; the incremental ratio
isless than the average ratio, so that the
averagestock-salesratiodeclines.Perhaps,
if the increase of sales in the particular store
is not part of a general increase in consumer
buying, stocks would not be augmented in
line with a constant average stock-sales ratio.
Instead, management might simply rejoice in
"improved stock turnover."
If, on the contrary, sales of most general
merchandise stores are improving along with
expanding consumer income and buying, a
different set of occurrences is to be expected.
Then stocks may increase not only by the
amount of the turnover rule of thumb but by
more. As more customers feel more affluent,
several qualitative changes in sales are likely
to occur which affect the size of stocks on hand
and on order. For one thing, customers "trade
up"; that is,they buy more heavily in the
higher price lines. This may justify adding
new higher price lines to the previous range,
or it may simply suggest enriching assortments
in the higher lines already carried; but in
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other thing, customers may be more inter-
ested in high-style items and novelties, and this
likewise tends to augment stocks. Affluence
may also cause customers to become somewhat
more interested in good service, including
ample stocks, in contrast to low prices.
Not only customers but merchants, too, may
be in an affluent mood and therefore receptive
to changes in customers' preferences as they
interpret them. But it is quite possible also
that changes have occurred incoststruc-
tures. I have already mentioned the possibility
that financing costs for stores that do not rely
on commercial borrowing may actually de-
cline. Salaries may have risen and availability
of sales help declined; if so, it may seem ad-
vantageous to increase the efficiency of the
sales force by carrying larger stocks.
These considerations explain why stocks rise
when sales do and why, as the actual sales-
ownership ratios indicate, they may rise more
than the efficient sales-stock link would pre-
scribe, other things the same.
There is another striking piece of evidence,
on which these speculations touch at best some-
what feebly: the close association between the
rate of change in sales and in ownership. The
efficient-service function, since this involves
a strong incremental association, would of
course tend to produce the empirically ob-
served parallelism between change in owner-
ship (since ownership is presumably little in-
fluenced by the inevitable failures of fore-
casts) and changes in consumer buying. How-
ever, I rather doubt that the clarity of the in-
cremental sales-ownership association can be
explained without placing primary responsi-
bility on the procedures for creating, perceiv-
ing, and correcting unintended change in
stocks.
For department stores, unintended change
must be present most of the time. Orders must
be placed ahead of time in order to have
goods on hand when needed. Orders must be
placed on the basis of forecasts of sales. But
forecasts are typically inexact because clair-
voyance is,at best, rare, and retailers have
no information on advance orders of their
customers. There is, therefore, an inevitable
discrepancy between most forecasts and actu-
ality. The first impact is on stocks. But be-
cause successful store management depends
on close control of stocks, they must be pre-
cisely planned. Also essential is machinery for
perceiving discrepancy between plans and ac-
tuality. Accordingly, the errors of forecasts
result in what I have called unintended, not
passive, change in stocks, and steps are taken
to correct the error. There are many ways of
doing so, and here we consider only one of
them, an important one, adjustments (which
may be positive or negative) in new buying.
The pattern of the adjustment is determined
by the character of the error. As explained
earlier, the error tends to be something very
close to first differences in sales with opposite
sign. Correction of this discrepancy through
alteration in new buying reverses the sign.
But the conventional shingled pattern of
buying and its seasonal patterns may have a
capacity to intensify the corrective factor. The
first impact of, say, underestimation is likely
to be in the "at-once" order; provisions are
found to have been too low. New orders may
need to be placed both to make up for the
earlier underprovision and to forestall like
future mistakes. If so, the correction would
apply the current pattern of monthly or bi-
weekly rate of change to expected sales of
several order periods.Similarly,thefill-in
order, anticipating sales of some weeks hence,
may need to correct for underestimation of
requirements when the preseason order was
placed.
We have spoken thus far of the impact on
stocks and buying of the level and rate of
change in sales. These several influences could
occasion a rise in stocks on hand and on order
relativeto the previous efficient-servicere-
quirements if there were no changes what-
soever in conditions in the markets in which
merchandise was purchased.
However, these changes stimulate and are
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in the markets in which retailers buy. This
interplay takes on increasing importance as
our analysis proceeds. Combined with the
fact that members of an industry have differing
sensitivities to market-oriented change, it be-
comes the core of what is described in the
last chapter as an ecological theory of fluctua-
tion. It will therefore be useful to rehearse
rather patiently how retailers are likely to pro-
ceed and to react. Much of the necessarily con-
jectural aspect of the analysis could be re
moved by appropriate investigations.
Some suppliers, those that have been lucky
indeveloping popular numbers,willap-
proach ceilings in productive capacity. If so,
they probably will quote longer delivery peri-
ods and refuse to promise prompt fill-in orders
at short notice. Perhaps they threaten that
present prices apply to advance orders only,
and they cannot guarantee that the same price
will apply later on in the season. But whether
or not these changes actually do take place,
itis likely that retailers may fear that they
will. If the changes actually do occur in con-
nection with the merchandise on which for-
tune has smiled, fear that they will occur
elsewhere is encouraged.
Seasonal patterns of buying may foster the
development of market stringency or laxness.
The preseason order covers requirements for
some stipulated portion of the expected sales
for a number of months—a "season" of perhaps
a third of a year (durations differ for different
seasons). There are advantages to placing or-
ders early, but it is critically important not
to buy more than will surely be used (after
also allowing leeway for short-term buying
intended to meet the unforeseeable whims in
consumer buying).Consequentlythepre-
season order must never exceed something
short of the least that will be required.
When business improves, two things are
likely to change. First, the estimate of the
least that will be sold moves up; itis not
impossible that the guess as to the least could
move up even if the guess as to the most likely
does not change.5 Second, the advantage of
placing orders early increases since failure to
do so threatens poor selections, slower or un-
reliable deliveries, and even higher prices.
Note that the retailer is forced to form a
judgment about future conditions since he
automatically takes some position—either a
long or a short one—when he places his pre-
season order. Buyers, uncertain about what
position to take, will be hungry for market
news and prone to imitate what the recog-
nized smart managements are doing.
I have been speaking of the impact of ex-
pectations about market conditions and con-
sumer buying on retailers' preseason buying.
But this buying itself must also have an im-
pact on actual market conditions, as well as
on further expectations about them. Actions
based on expectations tend to be partially
self-validating.
For one thing, conventional seasonal pat-
terns, particularly the advance preseason or-
der, may have a capacity to magnify the im-
pact of changed expectations. The point is
conjectural, but worth a moment's thought.
The preseason order covers a portion of re-
quirements for a number of months. If the
portion is increased, the additional buying
at the preseason date will apply to each of,
say, four months which constitute the season.
For example, assume that sales are expected
to be $100 a month for four months, 40 per
cent of which represents the usual preseason
order,atotal of $160. A shift in market
evaluation which dictates 55 per cent advance
coverage instead of 40 per cent implies an
increase of 4 x$15,or $60. This could con-
stitute a very large absolute increase in busi-
ness for companies receiving the orders; in
one month, extra orders for 60 per cent of
the monthly business are received. If sales are
also expected to rise, the additional buying
would of course be still larger. Thus if sales
This is a fancy point. It implies that the shape
of the probability distribution can change (kurtosis
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were expected to be 10 per cent higher, the
buying would be 55 per cent of $440, or $242,
an increase of $82. Though these orders may
actuallybefilledonamonth-by-month
pattern which is free of the bunched increase,
I wonder whether the bunching of orders does
not nevertheless influence market reactions.
News of large absolute increases in orders re-
ceived are more likely than news of small
ones to spread around a market and influence
opinion and even anticipatory actions of buy-
ers and sellers.
Thus far we have considered influences that
generate primarily from the side of demand.
They provide ample reason for ownership to
rise and fall with sales and with rates of
change in sales. They explain also how, in
both cases, response can be greater than re-
quired to enforce the efficient sales-stock link,
other things the same.
But broadly expanding sales imply higher
consumer income, and this in turn implies
that business conditions in general tend to be
good. If so, demand for, say, men's shirts by
department stores competes with demand from
other sorts of retailers. Firms supplying shirt
manufacturers with materials are also experi-
encing increasing demand for other clothing
and industrial materials. Demand from any
or all of these sources may either support or
initiate pressures on supply, which in turn
cause fear of further pressure, action to fore-
stallshortages, and thereby actual further
pressure, and so on through rings of cause and
effect.
Materials Orders of Department Stores
and the Acceleration Principle
The argument may be summarized in terms
of all the major factors that determine the
pattern of materials buying for department
stores and its relation to consumer buying.
1. Provision for expected sales. Merchandise
that is expected to be sold must of course first
be purchased. To do so, forecasting procedures
are required in so far as goods are not ready
for sale instantaneously upon the placement
of an order for them, and in so far as goods on
order are not perfect substitutes for goods on
hand. Department store merchandise is ready
for sale shortly after its arrival in the stores.
However, substantial quantities of merchan-
dise must be ordered many weeks or even
months ahead of time, and for these, forecasts
of requirements are necessary. Ignoring perti-
nent qualifications, this element of retailers'
buying may be thought of as having, broadly,
the pattern of earlier consumers' buying.
2. Sales-linked stock. As the level of sales
change, stocks that service them must change
roughly in proportion to the rate of change
in sales.
The essence of propositions 1 and 2 form
the law of "derived demand" as set forth many
years ago by J. M. Clark.6 The pattern of de-
rived demand will depend, on the one hand,
on the levels and shape of fluctuations in final
demand, since this determines the pattern of
rates of change and their relation to demand
proper. On the other hand, it depends on the
size and character of the capital ratio. The
capital ratio refers in effect to what I have
called the efficient-service requirement, other
things the same.
Since rates of change tend to lead data
proper,thenew-capitalrequirement(in-
creases or decreases in stocks) has the pattern
of rates of change in sales and tends to lead
sales proper. Because department stores re-
quire relatively large stocks, the capital ratio is
large and this leading element is correspond-
ingly emphasized. But the extent of the em-
phasis is moderated by the fact that the ef-
ficient-service requirement is not a constant
average ratio but more nearly a constant in-
cremental ratio and one which is less than the
average. Thus far the analysis parallels that
8JohnMaurice Clark, "Business Acceleration and
the Law of Demand: A Technical Factor in Economic
Cycles," Journal of Political Ecof&oiny, March 1917,
pp. 217—235 (reprinted in Readings in Business Cycle
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of J. M. Clark. The fact that we can inspect
data on orders, which Clark could not, pro-
vides the wherewithal for a sharp demonstra-
tion of the Clarkian logic.
But we have found that demand as con-
veyed to retailers' suppliers is not merely de-
rived demand in this simple sense. Factors in
addition to the previous two are at work;
they are:
3. Changes in opportunity cost of stocks.
The desired stock-sales ratio reflects change
in the cost of carrying stock relative to meet-
ing management objectives in some other way.
One form this can take results from the qualita-
tive changes in demand associated with pros-
perity and recession and what this means con-
cerning the selections that retailers want to
offer customers. Another form isthat of a
trade-off for selling costs.
4. Attentiontothetimingofbuying.
Conditionsinmaterials markets and ex-
pectations concerning them cause attention
to the timing of buying—the decision con-
cerning when expected requirements are pur-
chased. These changes feed on actual condi-
tions of supply such as levels of capacity,
utilization, quoted delivery terms, and news of
related markets; they feed on changes in de-
mand; they feed on the interaction between
these supply- and demand-oriented circum-
stances, and expectations concerning them, in
a potential merry-go-round of cause and effect.
I might add that John Maurice Clark made the
points of this and the preceding paragraphs
nearly fifty years ago.7
"The chief reasons for keeping a stock are, first, to
give the customer a wide selection of goods which he
canactuallyinspectand,secondly,togiveassur-
ance of being able to fill large orders without delay.
Obviously, the larger the order, the greater the
danger of being sold out, unless the stock is increased
in a corresponding proportion, or something not too
far short of it. (Note the last phrase.) The increase
in demand would not seem to make it necessary to
keep any wider range of goods in stock. But if we
are thinking, not of what is necessary, but of what
isprofitable, we have a different situation" (Clark
in Readings in Business Cycle Theory, p. 250).
size of stock is one element in the quality of
service rendered by any dealer, which means that it
5. Correction of error. The high importance
of stock control in retail stores implies not
only sharp definition of requirements but
prompt correction for failure to conform to
the stipulations. Failure of total "in-sights"
(total ownership) to conform will result from
faulty prediction of sales. If sales of the past
are the basis of prediction, correction will
have the pattern of rates of change in sales.
The required correction would presumably
imply reversing the undesired change in stock
resulting from the incorrect guess about what
would be sold. Depending on just how objec-
tives are formulated, it may also imply correc-
tion of service stock to a level appropriate to
the actual rather than forecast level of sales.
The pattern of these corrections will depend
on the pattern of ordering. Thus a shingled
is something in which he is likely to economize when
businessispoor, and tobe liberal when he can
afford it." Clark goes on to say that in good times
customers "would be less influenced by a slight saving
in price, which can only be made sure of after close
studyofthequalitiesofthe goods, than by an
obvious superiority in quality of service and range
of selection. When the buyer's mind swings in this
direction the merchant is invited to respond in kind
if he wishes to attract his share of the increase in
business.... Atime of general activity in business
isa time when large stocks are good tactics com-
mercially. One other fact which may make merchants
more willing to invest in considerable stocks is that a
time of growing demand for some one commodity, or
a time of general increase in activity, are both times
of rising prices for the intermediate products called
for in the business affected. This makes these com-
modities aprofitable investment so long ascredit
can be had on easy terms with which to enlarge one's
holdings. Merchants tend to assure their future sup-
plies by buying either outright or for future delivery"
(Ibid., p. 251).
"Taking all these things into consideration, one is
justified in concluding that an increase in demand
naturally tends toward an increased investment in
dealers' stocks, which is,if anything, more than in
proportion to the increase in sales, unless limited by
(1) difficulty in getting added credit to carry the extra
'workingcapital,'(2)an extremely sharprisein
supplyprices,(3)thefearthat theprosperityis
temporary, or (4)ti'ieinability of manufacturers to
make deliveries (Ibid., p. 252)."
I have quoted the discussion at some length because
I have had the feeling upon rereading it that my book
can be thought of as an effort to explore and extend
these insights of J. M. Clark of about half a century
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pattern of the sort described earlier implies a
stepwise adjustment. It may also involve some
magnification of error associated with highly
seasonal sales and ordering; the question in-
vites study.
I would like to defer the discussion of feed-
backs which the model implies. They are dis-
cussed in both of the following chapters. But
the reader must have noted that I may be
storing up trouble for myself. On the one
hand, feedbacks, and therefore multiplier ef-
fects, can take the form not only of income
but also of expectational elements. On the
other hand, my emphasis on orders, and the
speed with which they can be delivered sug-
gests that there is no justification for separat-
ing plans, actions, and corrections by formal
periods. Lloyd Metzler's analysis of inventory
cycles has featured the role of mistaken fore-
casts. But the dynamics that he emphasized
moved from current income (which formed
thebasis of expected sales)to subsequent
production, which, via the income payments
that it generated, determined actual
The errors that new orders are capable of
reflecting do not involve this long and some-
what artificial causal chain. More of this later.
What then does the analysis suggest about
the pattern of retailers' orders for merchandise
compared to their final sales to consumers?
Because of the need to forecast on the basis
largely of past experience, and because of the
high management priority accorded inventory
control, paragraphs 1, 2 and 5 should dom-
inate the recurrent picture. But this strong
impact of rates of change superimposed on
current levels of sales, which the large stocks
and correction pattern imply, may tend to be
further reinforced by the operation of the
cost and market oriented aspects of the model,
paragraphs 3, 4, and 5. Indeed, at times, ele-
ments generated on the side of supply or from
other markets may visibly imprint their in-
fluence on total buying.
Chart 15 compares this hypothetical picture
8 Lloyd Metzler, "Nature and Stability of Inventory
Cycles," Review of Economic Statistics, August 1941.
with the actual one. At troughs, sales cease
to fall very nearly at the same time that they
reach their maximum rate of decline.9 At
troughs, then, either one of the demand-ori-
ented influences—expected sales or demand for
capital (change in stock)—will cause new or-
ders to turn at about the same time. It seems
reasonable therefore that the median timing
of new orders compared with that of rate of
change insales was, except for the1954
trough, plus or minus one month (Table 40,
line 5).
At peaks, however, sales slowed their rate
of rise well before they began to fall (compare
Chart 15, curves 2 and 6). Change in owner-
ship—an empirical receptacle for all the as-
pects of the model except point 1—turned
within plus or minus two months of changes
in sales at five of the six peaks. At three of
these peaks, the magnification that change in
sales underwent as a consequence of owner-
ship objectives meant that the location of the
turns in total materials orders was strongly
influenced by the rate of change in sales; on
these occasions orders turned no more than
three monthsafterthecenteredrateof
change in sales. However the peak in new
orders that occurred in 1956 and 1960 oc-
curred many months after sales ceased to rise
at an accelerating rate. Apparently the strong
trend rise in sales kept the dollar value of
new orders rising very gently after the factors
embodied in the increasing rate of rise in
ownership had started to decline (Table 40,
lines 10 and 13a).
The model postulates that factors outside
of thefinal demand-associated complex of
events can also influence the pattern of back-
ward transmission of fluctuation. Evidence of
their influence on ownership has previously
been discussed. But on new orders, the impact
of price expectations, lengthening delivery
periods, and the like does not take a form in
which these influences are visible insofar as
9 Five troughs can be matched. The timing of change
in sales relative to sales proper is 0 for two of them,
—2 in 1958 and 1961 and —7 in 1954.226 SEARCH FOR EXPLANATIONS
they do not parallel changes in final demand.
That much of the influence does follow this
parallel course has been indicated by the
measures of exaggerated amplitude of fluctu-
ation that have been presented:Retailers'
buying has about two times the specific cycle
amplitude of the fluctuations in consumer
buying (see Table 24, line 1).
DURABLE GOODS MANUFACTURERS
The available data for durable goods fit poorly
into the conceptual framework required for
comprehensive analysis of fluctuations in own-
ership and its impact on the backward trans-
mission of demand.
First, there are the all too familiar tech-
nical shortcomings of the data: the difficulty
of using book-value figures to compare stocks
and flows at various stages of processing; the
fact that there is no way consistently to match,
for the same companies, sales orders (or ship-
ments or production) with inventories of ma-
terials on hand and on order and with orders
placed for those materials(orreceiptsof
them).
Second, we have studied only one of the
three major sorts of stocks on hand—stocks
of materials. The dynamics of change in ma-
terials stocks, and the backward transmission
of demand as a whole, ought to cover the
business alternatives concerned with whether
to accumulate or draw down stocks at any
stage of the productive process. The focus on
the "raw" materials stage alone is a limita-
tion that needs to be kept in mind.'0
Finally, since the time pattern of custom-
ers' orders may differ substantially from that
of shipments to them, "demand" confronts
the problem discussed at the beginning of
the chapter. Following the thinking there set
forth, I shall focus on the association of stocks
10Referenceto the total stock-shipment ratio, the
bottom curve of Chart 3, and to the rate of change
of all stocks, the fifth curve of Chart 6, suggests that
many statements concerning materials stocks may apply
to total stocks. This would be still more likely to be
the case if stocks were measured in terms of equivalent
unitsof output,the most appropriate notionfor
examination ofprocess, rather thanin book-value
terms. The latterunderweights the importanceof
raw and, to a lesser extent, in-process stocks.
and shipments and observe, as a second step,
the impact of changes in unfilled sales or-
ders."
Indeed, for some purposes, particularly the
examination of how stocks of materials on
hand relate to the "need" for them, the most
appropriate definition of demand might be
production starts, rather than shipments of
finished goods. However, there is no statistical
information on this series of events. Ship-
ments, then, will have to suffice.
The Sales Link—"Excess Stocks" and
Materials Orders
In Chapter 9, the over-all movement of ship-
ments and stocks of all durable goods manu-
facturers were seen to show substantial paral-
lelism. However, their conformity to business
cycles inhibits ascribing direct causal implica-
tion to the relationship, particularly since the
more responsive stockpile—ownership—shows
poor association with shipments (see Table
31).
Rates of change provide a more sensitive
test. And Table 41, line 3, shows in detail that
there islittle apparent tendency for manu-
11Thishas some advantages also in terms of the
technical difficulties of the data. Final products, defined
as products of the machinery and transportation in-
dustries,failto include the final products sold to
firms in other industries, and thus include too little.
On the other hand, final products, defined as products
of all durable goods industries, include products that
are intermediate and primary materials as well, and
thus include too much. It has been judged the lesser
disadvantage to include too much in dealing with
shipments, and too little when dealing with outstand-
ing orders. For thelatteritis important notto
cover as cause the very changes in outstanding orders
for materials which, aseffect,isa major focus of
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Line SeriesC 194719471948194919511952195319541957195819601961
Specific Series: Change in Shipments, All Durables
1Subcycles —7 —8 —11 —9 —10 —9 —3 —13 —3
2Change ownership 0 —2 —8 —6+4 —1 —1 0 +3 +7
3Changestocks,
materials 0 0 0 —2 —4 —10 —8 —8—15 —4 0 +2
4Change in out-
standings 0 0 —2 —8 —6 —4 —1 —1 +1 +3 +7
5New orders,
materials 0 0 0 —4 —7 —5 3 —3 —15 —2 +2 —2
6Change new
orders, materials 0 0 0 +1 0 +2+4 0 0 +3 +9+16
7Change produc-
tion, all dur. 0 0 —2 —2 —12 0 —2 —3 +1 +2 —2
8New orders,
mat. deflated 0 0 0 —4 —7 —8 —3 —3 —5 —2 +2 —2
Specific Series: Ratio: Material Stocks to Shipments, All Durables, inverted
9Subcycles —5 +1 —8 —8 —6 —6 —5 —9 —24 —1 —13 —1
10Change shipments —1 +2 +5+4 +1 +6+2 0 +2
11Change ownership +2 +1 —3 —6 —1 +8 0 +5+2 +3 +9
12Change stocks,
materials —1 —3 —8 —3 —2 —5 —4 —7 9 —2 0 +4
13Change out-
standings +3 +1 —3 —6 —1 +8 0 +5+3 +3 +9
14New orders,
materials —8 —5 —5 0 +1 —2 —9 0 +2 0
15New orders,
mat. deflated Q +3 3 5 5 3 +1 —2 +1 0 +2 0
16Change out-
standing orders,
final product +2 0 0 —1 —7 0 0 +1 —4 +7 —1 +1
17D.I. vendor
performance +3 +3 —1 —1 —3+7 —1 —3 +3 —6+10
18Corporate profits —8 —3 —3 —8 —3 0 —4 —2 —1 —1
Specific Series: New Order, Materials
19Subcycles 0 0 0 —3 —1 —6 —6 7 15 1 15 1
20Change out-
standing orders,
materials 0 0 +9 +2 —1 —1+7 +2+14 +3 +1 -f9
21Change stocks,
materials 0 0 +2 +3 —5 —5 —5 0 —2 —2 +4
22Shipments,
all durables 0 0 —1 3-2 7 6 —g 9 —1 4 0
23Shipments,
final product 0 0 —1 —5 —6 —9 —9 —1 5 0






















Specific Series:Change Shipments, All Durables
1Subcycles 900—9.0 —6.7 —8.71.23.12.52.3 —9 68 71
2Change ownership 531+1.0 —1.0 —0.74.03.03.53.4 —1 73 73
3Change stocks,
materials 71111.57.3—8.76.54.34.95.3 4,5 68 67
4Change in out-
standings 540+1.0 —0.7 —0.34.0 3.3 3.73.6 —1 72 73
5New orders,
materials 810—5.0 —3.0 —3.35.21.02.92.9 —3 68 73
6Change new
orders, materials 063+2.0 +2.0 +2.03.2 3.63.43.4 +2 75 77
7Change produc-
tion, all dur. 621—1.0 —2.0 —2.01.82.62.22.2 —2 81 82
8New orders,
mat. deflated 810—4.0 —3.0 —3.32.81.62.12.1 —3 76 81
SpecificSeries: Ratio: Material Stocks to Shipments, All Durables, Inverted
9Subcycles 11 10—7.0 —3.56.04.83.74.24.2 —6 73 74
10Change in shipments171+3.0 +1.7 +2.02.01.51.71.7 +2 82 85
11Change in ownership371+3.0 +1.0 +1.73.62.8 3.33.2 +2 80 78
12Change stocks,
materials 101 1 —3.0 —3.0 —3.03.0 2.3 2.72.7 3 82 82
13Change in
outstandings 371 +3.0 +1.5+2.32.83.23.43.0 +3 80 78
14New orders,
materials 523 —4.0 —0.7 —1.04.21.53.22.9 —1,0 76 81
15New orders,
mat. deflated 542 —0.3—1.0 —0.72.52.22.32.3 0 86 87
16Change in out-
standing orders,
final product 440+0.5+1.00 3.82.0 3.02 .9 0,+I 76 77
17D. I. vendor
performance 650—0.3 +1.0 +0.33.93.53.83.7 0 77 76
18Corporateprofits 90 1 —3.3—2.0 —3.01.6 2.0 1.91.8 —3 83 89
SpecificSeries: New Order, Materials
19Subcycles 901—7.3 —3.3—4.56.0 2.34.34.2 —4, —5 74 74
20Change out-
standing orders,
materials 280+5.7+2.3+2.54.92.33.93.6 1-2,+3 73 77
21Change stocks,
materials 532 —0.7 —1.7 —1.02.13.32.82.7 —1, —2 77 83
22Shipments,
all durables 901 —4.03.7 3.52.43.12.82.8 3,4 85 83
23Shipments,
finalproduct 701 —5.5—3.0 —5.02.23.2 2.82.8 —5 82 80
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facturers to enforce an incremental associa-
tion. Even after allowing for a lag of four or
five months for inventory investment relative
to change in shipments, only 69 per cent of
the months are in like phase.
There seems little reason to ascribe the lag
and poor correspondence to unavoidable error.
In view of the foreknowledge of shipments
that new sales orders provide for fabricators
of heavy machinery, stocks certainly could be
kept more closely associated with shipments if
there were reason to do so and to pay the cost
of doing so. Besides, the association is also
poor between change in shipments and change
in ownership for which a target size could pre-
sumably be enforced simply by modifying cur-
rent ordering. Line 2 of the table shows only
73 per cent of months in like phase after al-
lowing for a one-month lag of change in own-
ership.
However, needless to say, a company does
not ignore the level of shipments in designing
the level of stocks, nor can the speed with
which shipments rise or fall be ignored. Dis-
parities that are "too large" must be defined
at least in operating terms. Do the figures
point to any such definition?
A relaxed type of association is suggested
by the fact that since 1948, though not before,
there seems to be a tendency for a fall in
shipment to have been preceded by a retarda-
tion in at least the rate at which stocks rise;
similarly an upturn in sales was preceded by
a slower rate of fall in stocks (Chart 16,
theassociation between curves3and6).
But itis hard to describe the operational
meaning of this association. What it could
mean seems to be suggested in a more com-
prehensible way by the stock-shipments ratio.
It is shown as the second curve in Chart 16.
I would like to think of the curve as the locus
of "excess stocks." This notion starts with the
thought that there is some ideal association
between shipments and stocks of materials re-
quired to service shipments efficiently. To illus-
trate, assume that itis one month's supply
(.5 months for the book-value data assuming
value added is 50 per cent of the shipment
price). Then, by definition, when the ratio is
above a line drawn at .5, "excess stocks" are
positive; and when below it, they are negative,
that is, deficiency exists. Since the ratio seldom
fell below .5, stocks were never too low accord-
ing to this definition but only too large in
varying degrees.'2
Comparison between the two top curves of
Chart 16 suggests that the rate of change in
sales and the stock-shipments ratio are in-
versely correlated. Table 41, line 10, indicates
that, allowing for a two-month lead of change
in shipments, the two series are in opposite
phase 82 per cent of the months, 85 per cent
from 1948 on. Of course, sales are in the de-
nominator of the ratio and therefore even the
rate of change in sales might, because of the
arithmetic, have a tendency to be inversely re-
lated to it. But changes in stocks, the numer-
ator (third curve), have an inverse association
also; 82 per cent of the months are in op-
posite phase with stock investment lagging
three months (Table 41, line 12).
The typical relationships can be described
in these terms. Both stocks and shipments are
rising, and stocks more slowly than shipments
(the ratio is falling). But producers find the
rise in their shipments slowing down a bit.
Though they may start to reduce materials
buying, stocks, nevertheless, rise relative to
shipments—excess stocks,as defined by the
ratio, begin to build up (trough in the ratio).
Before long, shipments may start to fall, but
12Whatthe desirable level actually is needs to be
empirically determined. But for so complex an ag-
gregate as all durable goods producers, the question is
perhaps not too interesting. If the proper figureis
higher than .5, what I refer to as small excess stocks
would be a stock deficiency. The contours ofthe
curve would be unchanged. If the desirable stock-sales
ratio were more nearly a fixed incremental than fixed
average ratio, and the incremental ratio differed from
the averages, the contours may change. I have com-
puted a series assuming a fixed incremental ratio of
.5.Hadthis series been used instead of the one based
on a constant average ratio, the argument that follows
would be unchanged. Experiments suggest that this
would also have been true had the incremental ratio
been .33 instead of .5.230
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the cumulation of "excess stocks" continues
either because stocks continue to rise or, fall-
ing, do so more slowly than shipments. As the
fall in shipments starts to retard, retrench-
ment in stocks has a chance to catch up; the
ratio reaches a peak and reverses as stocks start
to decline faster than sales. As sales begin to
rise, this relative reduction in stocks continues
either because they have not started to rise or
because they do so at a slower rate than do
sales. This persists as long as sales continue
to rise at an accelerating rate. But soon after
they cease to do so, excess stocks cease to de-
cline and start once again to build up.
This description does not seem to me to
suggest a sharp inventory objective which is
incapable of prompt enforcement. For one
thing, the fact that orders are often on the
books many months before shipments need to
be made, or even production begun, suggest
that stocks could have been acquired at just
the most efficient time. But even if this had
not been the case, why would it not be pos-
sible to enforce a stock objective by ordering
materials from jobbers, or other manufactu-
rers, paying if necessary a premium price for
prompt delivery? If, on the other hand, stocks
are too high, suppliers could have been asked
to postpone deliveries. It seems reasonable to
suppose that these things are not done for the
reason that they are not worth doing. It is
advantageous neither to formulate a stock ob-
jective with so strong an emphasis on align-
ment with shipments nor to pay the cost of
monitoring and enforcing it.
The picture is rather that of a soft stock
objective—a link of stocks to sales consisting,
figuratively, of a set of elastic bands that pull
stock in some prescribed direction, but give
ground in response to pulls exerted by other
management considerations.
Needless to say, many other considerations
are present. The movement of the stock-ship-
ments ratio reflects the impact of these factors
at the point where materials stocks on hand
have been affected. Some of the factors may
have a fairly direct and prompt impact on
stocks; for example, the combination of un-
certainty about delivery conditions and ample
funds may cause a buildup, via orders for
fast delivery, of stocks on hand as insurance
against possible shortages. But other factors,
focusing on outstandings, will influence stocks
on hand only after a considerable interval;
classic examples are anticipatory orders with
long delivery periods, or those intended to
forestall an expected rise in price. Finally,
the pattern of withdrawals from stockpiles,
and failures to anticipate these, must also be
listed among the factors that influence the size
of materials stocks. Actions focusing both on
outstandings and on the pattern of with-
drawals from stock will cause current stock
objectives to be blurred by the impact
stocks of actions undertaken at some earlier
time which have, in a -sense, committed the
stock reservoirs to receipts or drains that tend
to oppose the present direction in which the
rubber bands are pulling.
This interpretation emphasizes the possi-
bility that an intention to validate a sales-
stock link may be so overlaid with other cur-
rent objectives, and the residue of earlier ones,
that it could not be seen in aggregative data;
at least not without a complicated and correct
conceptual model, good data of an unusual
sort, and, of course, multivariate analysis.
But if efforts to enforce sales-linked objec-
tives would be visible at all in the gross fig-
ures, they might be expected to be clearest at
the point where the instrument of control is
used. The act of ordering materials is the
chief instrument, and accordingly we examine
the patterns of ordering in the hope of identi-
fying action intended to correct excess or de-
ficiency in sales-linked stocks. Outstanding or-
ders for materials and their rates of change
also show the results of these actions. But since
current actions are only one of the things that
affect their size (see the analysis at the start of
Chapter 10), it is more useful to concentrate
on the flow of new orders for materials.13
13Inline with these thoughts, as Table 41, line 13,
indicates, change in outstandings tends to turn earlier
than the ratio matched inversely, and to have poor
positive conformity with the rate of change in ship-
ments (line 4).232 SEARCH FOR EXPLANATIONS
The fifth curve in Chart 16 is new-orders
for materials. (It is actually the sales orders
of the materials-producing durable goods in-
dustries.) The generally inverse association
with the stock-shipments ratio is clear enough.
The peaks and troughs in orders are generally
close to the dotted and solid lines drawn
through the troughs and peaks in the ratio.
Table 41, line 14, indicates that the association
is about synchronous on the average. However,
the over-all correspondence, matched inversely,
is only 81 per cent of months in like phase,
starting in 1948. But the particulars of the
individual turns suggest a more meaningful
connection. For one thing, six of the ten
matched turns are within plus or minus two
months of one another. For another thing,
the longer leads can be explained in terms
of market behavior. At the peak of the ratio in
1949 (excess stocks hypothetically had reached
their low), metals prices were falling rapidly,
and this could account for the continued fall
in new orders. Producers wanted to wait before
resuming buying, in view of the weakness
which the rapid fall in prices signified. At the
three peaks in orders in 1948, 1950, and 1956,
the lead of the ratio seems explicable in terms
of strong movements in prices. The periods
of delay between the beginning of excess
stocks (trough in the ratio) and the peak in
orders were quite precisely the periods of
rapid rises in prices to unusual highs. Com-
pare them with the bottom curve in the chart.
Presumably the optimism and increasing mar-
ket stringency that this implies caused pro-
ducers to buy more materials than they other-
wise would. "More" turned out to mean
enough to keep new orders rising. In 1956,
new orders turned down and the ratio up at
virtually the same time; and metals prices
were low and level.
For durables as for department stores, the
process generates materials orders which reach
peaks and troughs before those of shipments
of the finished goods in which the materials
are used. Inspect curves 5 and 6 in Chart 16.
Table 41, in lines 22 and 23, calculates that
new materials orders lead shipments at all
turns except one synchronous one. For all
durable goods shipments (which cover more
ground than we want) the median lead was
threeor four months and the correspondence
was high; 85 per cent of the months were in
like phase. For shipments of the final-products
industries only (which covers less ground than
we want), the median lead was five months
and the correspondence a bit lower.
I have explained the relation between excess
stocks and materials orders in terms of usual
and special conditions at particular times. The
net result is a strong lead in orders relative
to shipments. But I want to suggest a revision
of this explanation, which has been based en-
tirely on book-value figures, because of the
ambiguity that prices imply in this context.
The strict logic of the argument that links
"excess" stocks to buying calls for a relation
between physical quantities. The ratio, our
measures of excess stocks, approaches this,
since there is at least some degree of similarity
of the prices of numerator and denominator.
To make valid comparisons, new orders should
be deflated for the price element in book-value
figures. When this is done, the lag of new
orders relative to troughs in the ratio in 1948
and 1956 disappears, though the descent is
slow after the peak. The only substantial lags
that remain occur at the time of the acute fall
in prices in early 1949 and rise in 1950. For
the rest, materials orders rise as excess stocks
build up and fall as excess stocks disappear.
The two series can be compared at the top of
Chart 17; the ratio, curve 2, has been inverted
in this chart, so that direct rather than in-
verted association with new orders is to be
expected. Eighty-six per cent of months adhere
to this pattern on a synchronous basis (Table
41, line 15).
In pointing to the unusual regularity of
this association, one should not lose sight of
its logical and empirical link to the rate at
which shipments change. The difficulty of
catching up with acceleration in shipments is
the reason for the inverse movement of the
ratio. The rate of change in shipments can
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the context of the simple accelerator mecha-
nism of the kind which seemed to apply to
the buying of retailers. Using the deflated
new-order series, beginning in 1948, 81 per
cent of months were in like phase with cen-
tered change in sales leading by three months;
alternatively this may be regarded as a syn-
chronous association with change in sales dur-
ing the previous five months (Table 41, line
8). The longer leads at peaks occurred in
1950 and 1955, when market conditions were
tightening rapidly, and at least one of the
two longer leads at troughs occurred in 1949,
when markets were strongly deflationary. The
rise in new orders in 1947 was not present
in the rate of change in sales, and the latter
rose in 1956 while new orders continued to
fall. I stress the ratio as an intermediate cau-
sal link because of its most impressive em-
pirical attributes (of which there are more to
come), and because the logic of its operation
seems to me to correspond realistically to busi-
ness perceptions and techniques.
But without learning more about how ob-
jectives are formulated and enforced, itis
foolish to push any particular association very
far. These basic facts seem to stand out: (1)
Materials orders clearly turn consistently ear-
lier than shipments of finished products. (2)
The lead is strongly associated with some sort
of sales-linked inventory objective, albeit one
constructed of lastex. (3) The fact that it is
made of lastex, and that all sorts of other
factors cause it to stretch and retract, makes
one hesitant about calling the association an-
other clear example of the impact of derived
demand having the usual acceleration attri-
butes. It has the empirical manifestations—
the lead and greater amplitude. But to what
extent is the sales-link causally responsible?
Other Influences and Their Link with
Shipments
The answer must in the first place com-
prehend the amplitude of change, and here
I need to shift back to ownership. Even for
departmentstores,unplanned changesin
stocks(primarily presumably of an unin-
tended sort) made it undesirable to focus on
change in stocks for empirical observation of
the causal link to sales. For durable goods
manufacturers, passive as well as unintended
change in stock appears to be important.
Changes in ownership can presumably be more
deliberate. Of course, the very absence of sharp
parallelism between change in ownership and
in shipments means that the amplitude of
change in ownership will reflect other influ-
ences than that of the sales link; nevertheless,
magnitudes are of interest. It is useful to ask
to what extent the magnitude of change ex-
ceeds what an efficient sales-link might de-
mand.
Table 34 spoke to this point. There we saw
(line13)that on theaverage about3.4
months' supply was on hand and on order; 14
however,theincrementalassociation,the
ratio of the specific cycle increase in ownership
to that of sales, was equivalent to about 5.5
months' supply (line 11). If the ratio had re-
mained at a hand-to-mouth level, the incre-
mental association would have represented
3.2 months' supply, whereas a constant in-
cremental relation of 2, or more likely 1.5,
months would seem to define the efficient sales
link more realistically, assuming nothing else
changed.
The calculations can be interpreted in
terms of the proportion of total specific cycle
change in ownership that the several varieties
of sales links explain. Apparently the con-
stant hand-to-mouth average relation covered
about two-thirds of the total, whereas the
incremental association of 2 accounted for 45
per cent, and an association of 1.5 for about
a third (lines lOa, c and b).
The large cyclical rises and falls in owner-
ship relative to that of shipments must repre-
sent the impact of other elements that bear
on the patterns of procurement. But here, as
for department stores, we cannot even start
14Thebook value of ownership averaged 1.69 times
shipments. Assuming value added represents 50 per
cent of the value of product, this represents about 3.4
months' supply.284 SEARCH FOR EXPLANATIONS
to measure their joint impact by looking at
the times when shipments could not be re-
sponsible because ownership was moving in
a contrary direction. Only 14 per cent of the
totalrise and fallin ownership occurred
when ownership and shipments were in op-
posite subcyclical phases.15 In general these
figures tell about the same sort of story as
did the corresponding ones for department
stores;thereis more change in ownership
than the sales link justifies, most of which
nevertheless is confluent with cycles in sales.
However, the explanation for durable goods
manufacturing must, I believe, be cast less
in terms of problems of forecasting and correc-
tion of errors, and more in terms of shifts
inmarketconditions.Becauseshipments,
ownership, and market conditions all, broadly,
move up and down with general business con-
ditions, they also move up and down with
one another. However we can, I think, go
somewhat farther by way of identifying the
impact of market conditions and its relation-
ship to shipments than this statement sug-
gests.
For one thing, we saw in Chapter 10 that
a number of factors indicative of changing
costs and market conditions seemed to have
patterns corresponding to changing materials
ownership of durable goods manufacturers
after the influence of shipments had been sub-
dued by differencing or expressing outstand-
ings in terms of months of shipment. It seems
clear, in other words, that these factors are
there and influential.
For another thing, we saw in Chart 16 that
the influence of shipments on buying seems
to have at least two forms. The first reflects
the obvious need to replace the materials
shipped out in the form of finished goods, and,
further, to maintain stocks at some appropri-
ate level. Whether this need takes the form of
a constant average or incremental relation-
ship is perhaps not too important at the mo-
ment. The second is a rather elastic influence
15Fora description of the measure see note 4,
above.
impersonated by the stock-sales ratio which
reflects a cumulation of discrepancies from
the average level of replacement needs. When
the discrepancies are negative they stimulate
more buying, and when positive less buying.
Though these discrepancies themselves may
reflect short-term rates of change in shipments,
they may have the capacity to reveal aspects
of the interplay between short-term demand
and market conditions, the presence of which
issotantalizinglydifficultto photograph.
Chart 17 seems to suggest this liaison appara-
tus at work.
The stock-sales ratio is depicted in the sec-
ond curve of the chart. It has been drawn so
that its inverse impact can be viewed as a
direct one.'° Below it are drawn each of the
major factors that the previous analysis has
indicated show an association with the phe-
nomenon of market fluctuation. The particu-
lar forms included in this chart are based on
the findings of Chapter 10. They are intended
to maximize the general picture of parallelism.
Timing measures were given in Table 41.
In general the chart conveys the basic no-
tion that all of these phenomena may belong
to the same family of events. It suggests a few
of the family characteristics:
First, we see in the top two curves the im-
pressive correspondence previously noted be-
tween the periods when the ratio showed that
deficiencies were building up or declining
and those when the physical volume of new
orders for materials were increasing and de-
creasing respectively.
Second, the chart suggests that periods of
increasing deficiencies and rising new orders
for materials were usually times when a num-
ber of other things were also taking place:
more vendors were lengthening their delivery
periods; more producers were themselves pil-
ing up sales orders for future delivery; in the
aggregate, these occurrences were decreasing
at a declining rate or increasing at an increas-
16Thescale also has been increased so that, moving
upward on the chart, the figures start at about .80 and
ascend to about .50.11. FLUCTUATION IN OWNERSHIP AND INVENTORY MODELS
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Ratioof Materials Stocks to Shipments Compared with Selected Series,
Note: Shaded areas represent business contractions.
aDeflatedby wholesale price index for metals and metal products, 1957—59100.
bFive-monthcentered moving average of month-to-month change.
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ing rate. Two other things were occurring at
most of the times: profits and the price of
metals were rising. Consider the meaning of
each briefly in turn.
Lengthening delivery periods for materials
(third curve) probably reflectpressure on
plant capacity. Pressure may take the form
of a rate of increase in orders which it is un-
economical to produce at the rates at which
orders are written, or it may take the form of
levels of demand that put pressure on the
physical capacity of plants. The data on ca-
pacity reviewed in Chapter 10 were consistent
with the latter interpretation, among others.
In the company of the changes visualized in
Chart 17, we are prompted to ask whether
the pressure on capacity, and associated de-
lays in delivery periods, may itself result in
part from the spurts in materials buying re-
suiting from the interplay among the com-
plex set of influences that we have been dis-
cussing.
An increasing rate of change in backlogs
of sales orders (curve 5) means, of course,
that new sales orders are growing relative to
shipments of final products. In accordance
with the argument at the start of this chapter,
this may be thought of as a qualitative change
in demand. Advance orders for materials re-
quired to manufacture products for which
advance sales orders have been written may
be placed with far less of the risk otherwise
attendant on advance purchase of materials.
Indeed, failure to cover may be considered
risky.
Profits (bottom curve) provide the where-
withal for financing heavier commitments and,
I have argued, sometimes at lower opportunity
cost than average return on investment. They
also stimulate optimistic expectations and ac-
tions. Table 41, line 18, shows a notably close
association between profits and the stock-ship-
ments ratio three months earlier. Beginning
in 1948, 89 per cent of the months were in
like phase.
How the prices of basic metals are involved
in the complex of events is difficult to say.
One obvious causal connection—one moving
from actual change in pricesto expected
change in prices to changed levels of inven-
tories that should be held—is ruled out by
the timing association. This point was de-
veloped in Chapter 10. I shall suggest a dif-
ferent sort of possible causal relationship in
the final chapter. In the meantime, it is worth
noting that their behavior may reflect result
as well as cause—the pressure of demand on
prices.
Some particulars of how these market-linked
factors interact with the sales-linked elements
are suggested by their behavior during the
several episodes. The usual pattern may simply
be that of mutual reinforcement. However, in
a few cases divergences are suggested. In 1949
and excess stocks had ceased to build
up five months before new orders picked up.
These were, as indicated earlier, both times
when prices were falling drastically; perhaps
this, and other market conditions associated
with it, tended to delay the resumption in
buying.
Conversely, the continued increase in buy-
ing after the deficiencies at the time of the
Korean War boom had started to decline was
associated with a continued rise in prices and
a level of output that was checked no doubt
by capacity limitations in many firms. Pro-
ducers of heavy equipment and armament
were certainly among those whose backlog of
unfilled orders were rising and at an accelerat-
ing rate. But materials producers as well were
also slow in meeting orders, as the vendor per-
formance index shows. Thus, expectation of
shortages, or rising prices, caused more ad-
vance buying, which caused more shortages.
High profits provided ample funds which
could be temporarily invested in stocks both
profitably and with due regard for future
liquidity. These factors were strong enough to
keep materials purchasing rising, even though
shipments were no longer rising at an acceler-
ating rate and the effort to reverse the grow-
ing deficiency in stock on hand had met with
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apply to mid-1955, except that in this case the
continued buoyancy of market factors served
not to postpone the peak in new orders but
to greatly dampen the decline compared with
what the sale-linked set of factors would other-
wise have ordained.
The years following the business trough in
early 1961 are particularly interesting, since
they differ from the earlier period in a num-
ber of ways which seem internally consistent.
In the first place, when recovery set in in early
1961, shipments rose only gradually and at
a rate which underwent relatively little ac-
celeration. After mid-1961, the stock-sales ratio
likewise continued to record only a most grad-
ual increase in stock deficiency.
In line with this unusual start, on the side
of demand, of a prosperous period, there
seems likewise to have been little stimulation
of buying from the market-oriented elements.
Orders for final products declined only slightly
in the previous recession and increased only
slowly and steadily during the expansion that
followed. As a result, backlogs moved very
gradually upward and their rate of increase
was free of cyclical shapes. Capacity utiliza-
tion was generally low, and "worsening" of
vendor performance leveled off in 1961 and
did not rise further until 1964. Profits in-
creased, but the motive to invest them in in-
ventories was absent. Sensitive metals prices
fluctuated only very mildly until toward the
end of 1963.
Possibly the new scientific methods of in-
ventory management also played some part in
preventing the usual spurts in materials buy-
ing. Of particular relevance is the possibility
that better information and control techniques
has reduced unintended stocks. But it is most
hazardous, I believe, to heavily underscore
this element in the complex of interrelated
events. For one thing, most of the work on
data processing for inventory management
applies to finished stocks rather than pur-
chased materials. But more important, the
usual post-trough spurt in forward buying did
not take place. The outstanding-sales, or own-
ership-sales, ratios slipped consistently down-
ward after their peak in later 1959 until well
into 1964 (see Chart 2). The ratio of stocks to
sales recorded neither excess nor deficiencies;
it oscillated around the level of .50, or, ad-
justed for value added, one month's supply.
These facts are consistent with materials buy-
ing that is confined to requirements for actual
production plus a true sales-linked inventory
demand. And certainly a tendency of this sort
would have been reasonable in view of the
absence of the usual acceleration of final de-
mand and the low level of utilization of the
vast new plant capacity that had built up over
the past five years or more. As we all know
as this book goes to press, the situation did
not last.
Acceleration Model for Durable Goods
Manufacturers
The picture that the time-series sketch seems
to imply that though a model of materials
inventory for durable goods manufacture and
for department stores would cover the same
major elements, these elements would assume
different forms and have different relative im-
portance in the two types of enterprises. I
shall state the particulars baldly; they are ac-
tually fields of investigation.
1. Provision for expected shipments. Un-
like department stores, durable goods manu-
facturers often have some foreknowledge of
requirements. As the discussion early in this
chapter indicated, sales orders can provide
(though in different ways for different sorts
of firms) the basis of some very good guesses
about what materials will be needed, and in
ample time to purchase In so far as
17Arecent investigation by Michael Lovell provides
provocative information on this point. ("Sales Anticipa-
tions, Planned Inventory Investment, and Realizations,"
in Determinants of Investment Behavior, Robert Ferber
(Cd.), New York, NBER, 1967.) When the statistics on
salesanticipations now collectedby theOfficeof
Business Economics were used in explaining inven-
tories, the addition of outstanding sales orders does
not improve the result. Lovell notes that "this rather238 SEARCH FOR EXPLANATIONS
thisisthecase, new orders for materials
can actually precede shipments of finished
goods and related production requirements.
2. Sales-linked stock. As shipments change,
stocks must change in line with efficient ser-
vice requirements, thereby implying some-
thing like a constant incremental ratio which
is smaller than the average ratio. But an ob-
jective of this sort with respect to most durable
goods materials is unlikely to carry the same
management priority as does a corresponding
objective for merchandise stocks of depart-
ment stores.
3. Changes in opportunity cost of stock.
Prosperity-linked changes in costs are likely
to reduce the opportunity costs of stocks on
hand and on order. This can occur by means
of changes that reduce the cost of carrying
stock, e.g., larger backlogs of sales orders which
reduce risk, larger prosperity profits which, in
so far as they need to be kept liquid, provide
low-cost financing for stocks. It can occur by
means of higher cost of alternatives to stock,
such as high hire or overtime cost of flexible
production schedules.
4. Attention to the timing of buying. Du-
rable goods manufacturers must give consider-
able attention to just when they buy materials
which they expect to require. On the one
hand, conditions in materials markets are sub-
ject to substantial change capable of making
it expensive to buy at the wrong times. On
the other hand, manufacturers may often be
able to extend or contract market positions in
materials without much risk at least of buying
goods that will not be needed.
5. Correction of error. Attribute1of the
model implies that errors in forecasting sales
will not have the systematic relation to rates
of change that seemed to apply to department
stores. Indeed, for many firms, error in pro-
curement associated primarily with errors in
surprising result may well be explained by the possi-
bilitythatinearlierstudiesunfilledorders were
serving as a proxy for anticipated sales volume
This could mean that anticipations were themselves
based in important part on the behavior of backlogs.
forecasts of shipments may be relatively minor.
Attribute 4, on the other hand, implies that
other factors influencing procurement will of-
ten be faultily foretold—market changes are
volatile. Also, conditions which were correctly
foretold at the time when buying was done
may change, and thus cause ownership to
be presently too large or too small and ac-
cordingly requirecorrection. In part,this
correction will involve materials outstanding,
sinceitisinthe goods-on-order segment
that much of thefirst import of market-
oriented buying falls. But as orders are de-
livered, stocks on hand are affected, and ac-
cordingly their volume too may be judged too
large or too small. Note, however, that all of
these characteristics involve a good deal of
ambiguity about when ownership is too large
or too small. If so, the correction of error is
likely to be less a matter of enforcement of
some precise norm than of resistance to the
extent of departures from the norm. Thus,
as stocks diverge from their normal relation-
ship to shipments, either because of changes
in utilizations, in buying, or in the pattern
whereby outstandings are delivered, pressures
to reverse the discrepancies build up and are
acted upon.
Basic Characteristics of the Model
The models that I have sketched incorpo-
rate much that is familiar. They reassert, par-
ticularly, some of the basic thinking and find-
ings of Franco Modigliani and his collabora-
tors,CharlesHolt,Kalman Cohenand
The emphasis I have placed on the
18Asummary of a good bit of this work may be
found in Charles C. Holt and F. Modigliani, "Firm
Cost Structures and the Dynamic Responses of In-
ventories,Production, Work Force, and Ordersto
SatesFluctuations,"irsInventory Fluctuations and
Economic Stalilization, PartII,materials prepared
for the Joint Economic Committee, 1961 (87th Congress,
1st Session). See also Charles C. Holt, F. Modigliani,
J.F. Math, and H. A. Simon, Planning Production
Inventories and Work Force, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.,
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relevance of changing costs and opportunity
costs of stocks is paralleled by their analysis of
the impact of changes in production volume
and in levels of factory activity. For "ware-
house stocks," they believe that these elements
are largely absent because of the relative cost-
lessness of shifting the variations in demand
to suppliers. This sort of thinking implies that
different models are required for some sorts
of enterprises than for others—a notion that
in a different form appears very strongly in
the two models I have presented. These simi-
larities are reassuring since we have all ap-
proached the study of inventory behavior by
addressing ourselves to the functions that
stocks serve in individual enterprises and to
the cost structures that are relevant to ef-
ficient management.
Nevertheless, the work reported in the fore-
going chapters does suggest certain emphases
which differ enough from other work to have
substantial implications.
For one thing, full attention to opportunity
costs implies that the behavior of stock will
be different not only for the various sorts of
stockpiles,anotiondeveloped by Moses
Abramovitz long ago, but also for different
sorts of businesses. This is sharply demon-
strated by the very different behavior of ma-
terials stocks in department stores and in du-
rablegoods manufacture(botha"ware-
house" variety).
A second matter of emphasis is far richer in
analytic consequences. The germinal notion
is the serious attention to materials ordering
as distinguished from materials receipts. This
brings to the fore three sets of considerations:
First, the large changes in orders outstanding
that can result from changes in actual or ex-
pected market conditions. Changes in out-
standings leave an imprint on stocks. More-
over, since leadtimes have strong cyclical pat-
terns, cyclical fluctuation in stocks will tend
to be larger than it would be if this set of
influences were absent. Incidently, this last
remark applies also to many of the other
changes in cost structures, which likewise have
conforming cyclical patterns.
The second set of considerations concerns
the speed and relative costlessness with which
corrective action can be taken in the form of
adjusted new orders when stocks or total ma-
terials ownership departs from desired levels.
In consequence one cannot be satisfied to in-
terpret sales-stock relationships in terms of
distributed lags, a common device in econo-
metric analysis. For ownership, the association
is, we find, actually synchronous. This line of
thought implies that if one must concentrate
on stock rather than ownership it is essential
to envision the particulars of forecasting, or-
dering (including the cascade of orders of
different term), and enforcement techniques
and priorities. However it may often be more
informativeto make theanalysisin two
groups:first explain ownership and second
explain the flow of outstandings into stock.
The third set of consequences generated by
my emphasis on orders is more subtle and
more important. Orders placed for materials
are orders received by suppliers. The informa-
tion conveyed by the order and the associated
expectations can touch off actions which have
"multiplier effects" but without the usual time
lags. They can coincide with or precede, as
well as follow, the initial inventory invest-
ment, a subject taken up in the following
chapter.
Finally, the emphasis on how expectations
about supply conditions affect demand and
vice versa, necessary implications of market-
prospect-oriented buying, raises questions con-
cerning how demand-and-supply conditions,
and expectations concerning each, interact.
Obviously these interactions must constitute
an important part of an inventory model
for durable goods manufacturing. However,
as with the department store model, the feed-
back elements cannot be specified until some
remaining questions are considered. Market
information is rapidly conveyed;it can be
acted upon almost immediately; the impact
of these actions on markets, and on suppliers,240
and thus on the further information that is
conveyed and further expectations aroused,
is likewise swift. Why, then, are the contours
we have examined not that of a sharp rise, a
sharp fall, followed by perhaps a period of dol-
drum? I shall propose an answer to this ques.
lion in the last chapter. But first it is necessary
to review the impact of these inventory and
buying waves on economic fluctuationsat
large.
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